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I. INTRODUCTION 
The public domain may be defined as that body of literary and 
artistic works (or other information) that is not subject to any 
copyright (or other intellectual property right), and which therefore 
may be freely used by any member of the general public.1 This concept 
is implicit in the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 
which stipulates that patents and copyrights may only be granted “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” and only “for limited 
Times.”2 The “limited Times” restriction implies that patents and 
copyrights must expire at some point,3 and the “Progress” limitation 
implies that patents and copyright can only be granted for new works, 
not for pre-existing ones.4 Thus, once a previously granted copyright 
on a work has expired, the general public has a “federal right to copy 
and to use” the work without attribution.5 
Traditionally, the copyright public domain has been considered 
irrevocable. When a work enters the public domain, even if it failed to 
obtain any copyright protection in the first place, it remains in the 
public domain.6 However, Congress breached this traditional 
limitation when it enacted section 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act in 1994.7 (Section 514 is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A.) 
Section 514 “restored” copyright protection in the United States for all 
 
 1.   BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (9th ed. 2009); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S 
DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 354 (2d ed. 1995). For attempts at a more 
detailed definition and description of the public domain, see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975–77 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 
28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217–22 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public 
Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 783–813 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public 
Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149–52 (2003).  
 2.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3.   Cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) 
(Congress may not “create[] a species of perpetual patent [or] copyright”). 
 4.   See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to 
restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which 
add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by 
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ ”). 
 5.   Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34. 
 6.   Ochoa, supra note 1, at 234 & nn.132–33, 262–64, 320–22 (collecting cases); see also 
WILLIAM B. HALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 213, 13 C.J. 
1075 (1917) (“The omission of the notice by or with the consent of the copyright proprietor 
destroys the copyright and puts the work irrevocably in the public domain.”). Trademark law 
represents a limited exception to this principle, allowing business owners to appropriate words 
and symbols for use as source identifiers for their goods and services, thereby removing certain 
uses of those words and symbols from the public domain. See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 264–66. 
 7.   Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A 
(2006)). 
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works of foreign origin that were not yet in the public domain in their 
source countries, but that were in the public domain in the United 
States for various specified reasons.8 By removing an entire body of 
works from the public domain, Congress challenged the idea that the 
Patent and Copyright Clause implicitly limits Congress’s power to 
grant patents and copyrights over material that previously was in the 
public domain and could be freely used by anyone. 
  In Golan v. Holder,9 the Supreme Court will consider whether 
Congress’s action in removing thousands of foreign works from the 
public domain violates either the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution or the First Amendment.10 Golan, however, is not an 
isolated case; it is one of four test cases that were initially filed by law 
professor Lawrence Lessig to challenge various aspects of a decade-
long expansion of copyright—and corresponding diminution of the 
public domain—enacted by Congress in the 1990s.11 Thus, in order to 
understand the significance of Golan, it is helpful to revisit the major 
congressional actions that led to those test cases, and to consider how 
the public domain has been harmed by those actions.  
  Part II of this Essay describes the international copyright 
considerations that motivated Congress to act, while Part III reviews 
Congress’s revisions to copyright law and the effect of those revisions 
on the public domain. Part IV examines the court challenges brought 
against those revisions. Part V discusses the importance of Golan and 
the actual and potential impact it will have on the public domain. 
Other essays in this Roundtable will discuss the merits of the case. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE BERNE CONVENTION 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works is the major international treaty concerning copyright 
protection for works of foreign nationals.12 The United States, 
however, did not join the Berne Convention for more than a century 
after it was signed in 1886,13 because our approach to copyright 
 
 8.   For details of copyright restoration, see infra Part V.A. 
 9.   609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 10.   See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2010).  
 11.   See infra Part III (congressional expansion of copyright); infra notes 63–76 and 
accompanying text (test cases). 
 12.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as 
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 
available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
 13.   See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, 
LAW, AND PRACTICE § 3.1.2.1, at 37–38 (2d ed. 2010) ("The United States of America was the 
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protection was fundamentally different from that of the rest of the 
world. Whereas most nations consider copyright to be a natural right 
of the author, which arises automatically as a result of the act of 
authorship,14 the United States has traditionally viewed copyright 
primarily as a utilitarian law, designed as an incentive for the 
creation and distribution of new works of authorship.15 As a result, 
while the Berne Convention prohibits conditioning copyright 
protection on any formalities,16 the United States previously required 
authors to comply with various formalities in order to obtain copyright 
protection.17 For example, under the 1909 Copyright Act, authors had 
to publish their works with proper copyright notice to obtain a federal 
statutory copyright.18 If a work was published without proper notice, 
the author was deemed to have dedicated the work to the public 
domain.19 The United States also required authors to register their 
works in order to enforce their copyrights by an infringement suit.20 
Another fundamental difference between the United States and Berne 
parties was the question of duration. While the Berne Convention 
 
single, commercially most important country to remain outside the Berne Union for its entire 
first century. . . . The United States finally adhered to the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989."). 
 14.   See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 27(2) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to the protections of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author.”); GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 13, § 1.2, at 6–7. 
 15.   See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for 
an author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 16.   See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(2) (“The enjoyment and the exercise of 
these rights shall not be subject to any formality . . . .”). 
 17.   See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 13, § 3.1.2.1, at 38 ("Political pressure to 
retain formalities . . . , which were prohibited since 1908 by the Berlin Text [of the Berne 
Convention], was one reason the United States declined to join Berne."). Formalities serve a 
number of purposes in a utilitarian-based system of copyright, including recording and 
preserving data concerning ownership and duration, and requiring authors and artists to 
distinguish those works for which copyright protection is desired from those for which it is not. 
See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 500–39 (2004). 
 18.   Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 10 in 
1947, repealed 1978). 
 19.   See, e.g., Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 F. 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) 
(“[P]ublication without such notice amounts to a dedication to the public sufficient to defeat all 
subsequent efforts at copyright protection.”), aff’d on other grounds, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1914); 
HALE, supra note 6, § 213, at 1075. 
 20.   Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 13 in 
1947, repealed 1978) (“No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright 
in any work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of copies and registration 
of such work shall have been complied with.”). 
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required that member nations protect works for the life of the author 
and fifty years after the author’s death,21 under the 1909 Act the 
United States provided only a fixed term of twenty-eight years of 
copyright protection, which could be renewed once for another twenty-
eight years if the author complied with the formality of registering the 
copyright in the renewal term.22 
The Copyright Act of 197623 removed some of the objections to 
Berne membership by automatically granting protection from creation 
to new works of authorship for a term of life of the author plus fifty 
years.24 However, the United States still could not join the Berne 
Convention because the 1976 Act continued to require the formalities 
of notice when a work was published and registration as a condition of 
judicial enforcement.25 In addition, the United States retained the 
formality of renewal for works already published or registered under 
the 1909 Act.26 
Because the United States was (and is) the world’s largest 
exporter of copyrighted works, it was in the national interest to 
encourage other nations to grant broad copyright protection to U.S. 
works. Such protection, however, could only effectively be 
accomplished by joining the Berne Convention.27 Thus, in 1988 
Congress enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
(“BCIA”).28 The BCIA made copyright notice optional rather than 
 
 21.   See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(1). The life-plus-fifty term was 
recommended in the 1908 Berlin text of the Berne Convention and became mandatory in the 
1948 Brussels text. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin Under 
the 1909 Copyright Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 290 & nn.26–27 
(2010). 
 22.   Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 24 in 
1947, repealed 1978). 
 23.   Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805). The 
Act took effect January 1, 1978. Id. § 102, 90 Stat. at 2598–99. 
 24.   Id. § 302(a), 90 Stat. at 2572. 
 25.   See id. §§ 401–06, 90 Stat. at 2576–79 (notice); id. §§ 408–12, 90 Stat. at 2580–83 
(registration). 
 26.   See id. § 304(a), 90 Stat. at 2573–74; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 139 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5755 (“A great many of the present [renewal] expectancies in these 
[works] are the subject of existing contracts, and it would be unfair and immensely confusing to 
cut off or alter these interests. Renewal registration will be required during the 28th year of the 
copyright but the length of the renewal term will be increased from 28 to 47 years.”). 
 27.   See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2–5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707–10 
(stating the reasons for joining the Berne Convention). 
 28.   Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). The BCIA took effect March 1, 1989. Id. § 
13, 102 Stat. at 2861; World Intellectual Prop. Org., Berne Notification No. 121, Accession by the 
United States of America, November 17, 1988, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_121.html (listing date of entry 
into force of March 1, 1989). 
Ochoa__Page.doc (Do Not Delete) 10/3/11 2:39 PM 
128 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC  [Vol. 64:123 
mandatory,29 and it retained the formality of registration as a 
condition of filing suit only for domestic works.30 For foreign works, an 
infringement suit can now be filed without the formality of 
registration,31 although registration was (and is) still required to 
obtain the additional remedies of statutory damages and recovery of 
attorney’s fees.32 
Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires that new member 
nations provide retroactive protection to other Berne parties’ works 
“which, at the moment of [the Convention’s] coming into force, have 
not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through 
the expiry of the term of protection.”33 This provision is subject to two 
limitations. First, if “through the expiry of the term of protection 
which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public 
domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not 
be protected anew.”34 Second, in the absence of a special agreement on 
retroactive protection, each country may determine for itself “the 
conditions of application of this principle.”35 
When the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, 
however, it took no action to implement Article 18. Moreover, 
Congress made it abundantly clear that it did not consider the Berne 
Convention to be self-executing, and that the Convention could be 
enforced only to the extent that it had been implemented in domestic 
law.36 Thus, despite Article 18, works of foreign origin that had 
 
 29.   Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857–58 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 401–406 (2006)).  
 30.   The original statutory phrase was “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in 
Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United States.” Id. § 9(b)(1)(B), 102 
Stat. at 2859 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006)). 
 31.   The current statutory phrase is “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any 
United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been 
made in accordance with this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). A “United States work” is defined 
as a work first published in the United States or simultaneously published in the United States 
and in another country, or an unpublished work whose authors are all nationals, domiciliaries, 
or habitual residents of the United States. Id. § 101. 
 32.   Id. § 412. 
 33.   Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 18(1). 
 34.   Id. art. 18(2). 
 35.   Id. art. 18(3). 
 36.   See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2006) (“No right or interest in a work eligible for protection 
under this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne 
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto. Any rights in a work eligible for 
protection under this title . . . shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, 
the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.”); Pub. L. 
No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (1988) (“The obligations of the United States under the 
Berne Convention may be performed only pursuant to appropriate domestic law. . . . The 
amendments made by this Act . . . satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the 
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previously entered the public domain in the United States remained 
there for the time being.37 
III.  CONGRESS’S ASSAULT ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
In the 1990s, Congress enacted four major pieces of legislation 
that had the effect of drastically reducing the scope of the public 
domain. 
First, in 1992, Congress enacted the Copyright Renewal Act.38 
This Act applied only to works that had been published or registered 
under the 1909 Act between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 
1977.39 All such works were still subject to the requirement that the 
copyright be renewed after the initial twenty-eight-year term in order 
to receive an additional term of protection.40 Historically, only about 
ten to fifteen percent of all eligible works were renewed; the remaining 
eighty-five to ninety percent entered the public domain after the 
expiration of the first twenty-eight years of copyright protection.41 The 
Act, however, made copyright renewal automatic, so that even if no 
author or other copyright claimant came forward to register the work, 
the renewal term automatically vested anyway.42 By changing 
 
Berne Convention and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that 
purpose.”); id. § 3(a), 102 Stat. at 2853 (“The provisions of the Berne Convention . . . shall be 
given effect under title 17, as amended by this Act, and . . . shall not be enforceable in any action 
brought pursuant to the provisions of the Berne Convention itself.”). 
 37.   Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 12, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988) (“Title 17 . . . as amended by this 
Act, does not provide copyright protection for any work that is in the public domain in the United 
States.”). 
 38.   Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. I, 106 Stat. 264 (1992). 
 39.   Id. § 102(g)(2). 
 40.   See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2573. The 1976 
Act had extended the second term from twenty-eight years to forty-seven years, resulting in a 
maximum term of protection of seventy-five years from first publication or registration. Id; see 
also Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical 
Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 42–43 (2001) (explaining the term extension in the 
1976 Act). 
 41.   See BARBARA A. RINGER, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 31: RENEWAL OF 
COPYRIGHT app. C at 222 (Comm. Print 1961) (prepared for the S. Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (finding that for works first 
published between 1923 and 1932, for which renewal was to be made between 1950 and 1959, 
the percentage of renewals varied between 9.85% (in 1953) to 14.70% (in 1959)). The data from 
1959 showed that of works registered in 1931–32, thirty-five percent of musical compositions 
(Class E) and seventy-four percent of motion pictures (Class L) were renewed, but only seven 
percent of books (Class A) and only eleven percent of periodicals (Class B) were renewed. Id. at 
220–21. 
 42.   See Pub. L. No. 102-307, § 102(a), 106 Stat. 264, 265 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2006)) (providing for the vesting of a renewal term both when an 
application for extension has been made and when such application has not been made by the 
expiration of the initial copyright term). 
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copyright renewal from an “opt-in” system to an “opt-out” system, 
Congress effectively deprived the public domain of the eighty-five to 
ninety percent of works that would otherwise have entered the pubic 
domain between 1993 and 2006 under the renewal provisions of the 
1976 Act.43 Instead, all of those works would remain under copyright 
until at least between 2040 and 2053.44 
Second, in 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (“URAA”).45 The purpose of the URAA was to 
implement the changes made by the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”), 
which was one of the annexes to the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).46 The TRIPS Agreement made all 
of the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention (except for 
Article 6bis, on moral rights) enforceable between nations under the 
dispute-resolution mechanism of the WTO.47 Because Article 18 of the 
Berne Convention would now be enforceable against the United 
States, the United States had to make some effort to comply with 
Article 18. However, where other nations chose only minimal 
compliance with Article 18, by enacting permanent protection for so-
called “reliance parties” (persons or entities that had relied on the 
public domain status of the works in some way),48 Congress enacted 
 
 43.   Because “[a]ll terms of copyright . . . run to the end of the calendar year in which they 
would otherwise expire,” 17 U.S.C. § 305 (2006), works published or registered in 1964 had their 
first twenty-eight-year term run until December 31, 1992, and would have entered the public 
domain on January 1, 1993, if not renewed. Works published or registered in 1977 had their first 
twenty-eight-year term run until December 31, 2005, and would have entered the public domain 
on January 1, 2006, if not renewed. 
 44.   For works published or registered in 1964, seventy-five years of copyright protection 
would endure until December 31, 2039, and the work would enter the public domain on January 
1, 2040. For works published or registered in 1977, seventy-five years of copyright protection 
would endure until December 31, 2052, and the work would enter the public domain on January 
1, 2053. These periods were extended again by twenty years in 1998. See infra notes 55–58 and 
accompanying text. 
 45.   Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (copyright restoration provisions codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)). 
 46.   See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 47.   Id. arts. 9(1), 64. 
 48.   See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D. Colo. 2009) (citing “temporally 
permanent” accommodations provided by Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the U.K. law), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
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far more sweeping protection. Effective January 1, 1996,49 section 514 
of the URAA automatically restored copyright protection to all works 
of foreign origin that were not yet in the public domain in their source 
countries, but that were in the public domain in the Untied States for 
specified reasons.50 As for reliance parties, Congress required that 
they be given either actual or constructive notice of the restoration.51 
Once notice was given, reliance parties had one year to sell off any 
existing inventory of copies of restored works, after which any further 
exploitation would be infringing.52 The result was that thousands of 
foreign works that had been in the public domain in the United States 
were placed under copyright protection for the same terms that they 
would have received if they had been eligible for copyright protection 
and had complied with all the necessary formalities required by U.S. 
law.53 
Third, in 1998 Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation: 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)54 and the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”).55 While the DMCA did not 
directly affect the scope of the public domain,56 the CTEA extended the 
terms of all existing and future copyrights by twenty years,57 resulting 
in a near-moratorium on new works entering the public domain until 
2019.58 
 
 49.   See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(A) (2006) (defining the “date of restoration” of a restored 
copyright as January 1, 1996, for works with a source country that adheres to the Berne 
Convention or that was a WTO member country on such date). 
 50.   Id. § 104A(a)(1)(A), (h)(6). For details concerning copyright restoration, including the 
specified reasons, see infra Part V.A. 
 51.   Id. § 104A(c). 
 52.   Id. §§ 104A(d)(2), 109(a). In order to protect the movie industry, however, Congress 
provided that a reliance party could continue to exploit any existing derivative works that were 
based on now-restored works, upon payment of “reasonable compensation.” Id. § 104A(d)(3). 
 53.   See id. § 104A(a)(1)(B). 
 54.   Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
17 U.S.C.). 
 55.   Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101, 108, 203, 301–04 (2006)). 
 56.   However, the DMCA made it more difficult for consumers and users to gain access to 
public domain works distributed only in encrypted formats by prohibiting the distribution of 
decryption devices and software. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2006)). 
 57.   Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 302–04). See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 44–46. 
 58.   Ochoa, supra note 40, at 46. The only works that will enter the public domain before 
2019 are works by authors who died more than seventy years before the current year that were 
unpublished and not registered on January 1, 1978, and that remained unpublished on 
December 31, 2002. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (providing duration of copyright for works created but 
not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978). 
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The net result of these congressional actions on the public 
domain was dramatic. Had the 1909 Act remained the law, all works 
published or registered before 1955 would now be in the public 
domain.59 Even under the 1976 Act as enacted, all works published or 
registered before 1936 would now be in the public domain,60 along 
with the vast majority of works published or registered between 1936 
and 1977.61 Many works of foreign origin would be in the public 
domain for failure to comply with formalities, and all works of foreign 
origin published before the United States had copyright treaty 
relations with the country of origin would be in the public domain.62 
Instead, the public domain is now limited to works published or 
registered before January 1, 1923, and those domestic works 
published or registered between 1923 and 1963 that were not 
renewed. All domestic works published or registered in 1923 or later 
and properly renewed, all domestic works published or registered in 
1964 or later, and all works of foreign origin published or registered in 
1923 or later are currently under copyright in the United States. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Lessig’s first test case was Eldred v. Reno, which challenged 
the CTEA on the ground that it violated both the First Amendment 
and the Patent and Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.63 Each 
of the plaintiffs64 alleged it was harmed because it had planned to 
 
 59.   Under the 1909 Act, the maximum term of copyright was fifty-six years from first 
publication, so any works published in 1954 would have remained under copyright until 2010 
and would have entered the public domain on January 1, 2011. See supra note 22 and 
accompanying text.  
 60.   Under the 1976 Act as enacted, the maximum term of copyright for works published 
before 1978 was seventy-five years from first publication, so any works published in 1935 would 
have remained under copyright until December 31, 2010, and would have entered the public 
domain on January 1, 2011. See supra note 40.  
 61.   Under the 1976 Act as enacted, works published before 1978 still had to be renewed. If 
not renewed, they entered the public domain at the end of their first twenty-eight-year term. 
Historically, only about ten to fifteen percent of all eligible works were renewed. See supra note 
41. 
 62.   See infra Part V.A. 
 63.   Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 58–66, 76–80, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 1999) (No. 99-CV-00065), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/ 
cyber/complaint_amd2.html. Another count alleged that that the CTEA violated the public trust 
doctrine, id. ¶¶ 69–73, but this theory was rejected by the district court and was not appealed. 
For an analysis of the public trust theory, see Ochoa, supra note 40, at 113–16. 
 64.   Eric Eldred is an individual who posts public domain literary works on the Internet 
under the name the Eldritch Press. He was later joined by three publishers of public domain 
works: Dover Publications, Inc., Higginson Book Co. (genealogy & history), and Tri-Horn 
International (golf); three users of public domain sheet music: Jill A. Crandall (church choir 
director), Luck’s Music Library (retailer) and Edwin F. Kalmus & Co. (publisher); two users of 
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reprint, restore, perform, or use works that would have entered the 
public domain but for the CTEA.65 On October 28, 1999, the district 
court granted the Government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
and the judgment was affirmed by a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit 
on February 16, 2001.66 After new Attorney General John Ashcroft 
succeeded Janet Reno, the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing was 
rejected on July 13, 2001.67 
Following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Eldred, Lessig filed two 
more test cases, each challenging both the CTEA and section 514 of 
the URAA on the grounds that they violated the Patent and Copyright 
Clause and the First Amendment. Golan v. Ashcroft was filed on 
September 19, 2001,68 and Luck’s Music Library v. Ashcroft was filed 
on October 29, 2001.69 The plaintiffs in each case alleged that they 
were affected by copyright restoration when various works of foreign 
origin were removed from the public domain.70 
Before the district courts could act, however, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Eldred v. Ashcroft.71 As a result, both 
district courts stayed the actions pending the outcome of Eldred. On 
January 15, 2003, the Supreme Court held, 7–2, that the CTEA did 
not violate either the Patent and Copyright Clause or the First 
 
public domain movies: American Film Heritage Association (non-profit association devoted to 
film preservation) and Moviecraft, Inc. (commercial film archive); and Copyright’s Commons, a 
non-profit public domain advocacy organization founded by Lessig (later renamed Creative 
Commons). Second Amended Complaint, supra note 63, ¶¶ 1–11; CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); ELDRITCH PRESS, www.eldritchpress.org 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 65.   Second Amended Complaint, supra note 63, ¶¶ 27–55. 
 66.   Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). For an analysis of the district 
court’s opinion, see Ochoa, supra note 40, at 109–16. For an analysis of the circuit court opinion, 
see id. at 116–20. 
 67.   Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For an analysis of the opinion 
denying rehearing, see Ochoa, supra note 40, at 120–24. 
 68.   Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 01-B-1854), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft/complaint.pdf. The plaintiffs in 
Golan were Lawrence Golan, a music professor at the University of Denver and conductor of the 
Portland (Maine) Ballet Orchestra and the Atlantic Chamber Orchestra; Richard Kapp, 
conductor and founder of the Philharmonia Virtuosi, and his recording company, S.A. Publishing 
Co. (d/b/a ESS.A.Y Recordings); the Symphony of the Canyons, a community orchestra in Utah; 
Ron Hall, d/b/a Festival Films; and John McDonough, d/b/a Timeless Video Alternatives 
International. Id. ¶¶ 6–11. 
 69.   Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d sub 
nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The lead 
plaintiff in Luck’s Music Library was a retailer of public domain music and was joined by 
Moviecraft, Inc., a commercial film archive. 321 F. Supp. 2d at 110–11. 
 70.   Luck’s, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 110–11; Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 78–90. 
 71.   534 U.S. 1126 (2002). 
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Amendment.72 In rejecting the Patent and Copyright Clause 
challenge, the Court noted that the plaintiffs did not challenge the 
absolute duration of the copyright term, but only contended that 
whatever period Congress selected could not be extended 
retroactively.73 In rejecting the First Amendment challenge, the Court 
remarked that “when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment 
scrutiny is unnecessary.”74 
In the wake of Eldred, Lessig filed a fourth test case, Kahle v. 
Ashcroft, which attempted to capitalize on the Supreme Court’s 
remarks by arguing that Congress had changed the “traditional 
contours of copyright protection” when it changed copyright from an 
“opt-in” system requiring renewal to an “opt-out” system of automatic 
renewal, and that the life-plus-seventy-year term itself violated the 
“limited Times” provision of the Patent and Copyright Clause.75 The 
district court summarily dismissed the case based on Eldred, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.76 
Meanwhile, in the two pending cases concerning copyright 
restoration, the court in Golan acted first, denying the Government’s 
motion to dismiss on March 16, 2004.77 Three months later, the 
district court in Luck’s Music Library granted the Government’s 
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Congress had on three previous 
occasions removed some works from the public domain,78 and that the 
 
 72.   Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). 
 73.   Id. at 193. 
 74.   Id. at 221. 
 75.   Complaint at 35–52, 92–101, Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24090 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 19, 2004) (No. C-04-1127). The plaintiffs were Brewster Kahle, founder and chairman of the 
Internet Archive, a non-profit corporation that makes public domain works available on the 
Internet; and Richard Prelinger, President of Prelinger Associates, Inc., which owns and operates 
the Prelinger Archive, an extensive collection of advertising, educational, industrial, and 
amateur films. Id. ¶¶ 1–4. Plaintiffs alleged that they desired to make “orphan” works (works for 
whom no copyright owner can be located) available on the Internet, but were deterred by the 
threat of criminal copyright infringement. Id. ¶¶ 75–78. 
 76.   Kahle v. Ashcroft, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1888 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004), aff’d sub nom. 
Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 77.   Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221 (D. Colo. 2004), motion for summary 
judgment granted sub nom. Golan v. Gonzales, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808, 1809 (D. Colo. Apr. 
20, 2005), rev’d in part, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007), on remand sub nom. Golan v. 
Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076, 1094 (10th Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 78.   Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113–16 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d 
sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The 
Copyright Act of 1790 allowed previously published works to qualify for copyright upon 
compliance with the requisite formalities; and following World Wars I and II, Congress allowed 
foreign copyright owners who were unable to comply with the requisite formalities during the 
war a grace period to do so after the cessation of hostilities. 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113–16. Whether 
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“traditional contours of copyright protection” were limited to the idea-
expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.79 The plaintiffs 
appealed only the Patent and Copyright Clause portion of the ruling, 
and the D.C. Circuit affirmed on May 24, 2005.80 
The district court in Golan fell into line, granting the 
Government’s motion for summary judgment on April 20, 2005, on the 
grounds that Congress had previously restored some works from the 
public domain, and that the private enforcement of copyrights does not 
implicate the First Amendment.81 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the ruling that the Patent and Copyright Clause does not 
prohibit Congress from removing copyrights from the public domain; 
but with regard to the First Amendment, it held that “the traditional 
contours of copyright protection include the principle that works in the 
public domain remain there . . . .”82 The court acknowledged that “the 
history of the 1790 [Copyright] Act could be highly informative of the 
Framers’ views,” but it concluded that “the answer to the question of 
whether Congress thought it was removing works from the public 
domain [in 1790] is probably not just unclear but also unknowable.”83 
It also found that two wartime acts allowing foreign copyright owners 
a grace period to comply with the required formalities after the 
cessation of hostilities “were, at most, a brief and limited departure 
from a practice of guarding the public domain.”84 The court further 
held that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests were implicated by 
the Government’s action in restoring copyrights, and that neither the 
idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine, nor the URAA itself 
were adequate to protect the First Amendment interests at stake.85 It 
therefore remanded the case with instructions to determine whether 
 
Congress believed in 1790 that previously published works were in the public domain or not 
remains a hotly debated question. See Brief of H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui and Tyler T. Ochoa as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_ 
Updates/10-545_petitioneramcu2scholars.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 79.   Luck’s v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 118–19. 
 80.   Luck’s v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d at 1265–66. 
 81.   Golan v. Gonzales, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. The court also held that the URAA 
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1821–22. The plaintiffs 
did not appeal this portion of the district court’s opinion. 
 82.   Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1186–89 (10th Cir. 2007), on remand sub nom. Golan 
v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 83.   Id. at 1191. 
 84.   Id. at 1192; see also id. (“The fact that the legislation was passed in response to the 
exigencies of a world war suggests that Congress felt compelled to depart from its normal 
practice of preserving the public domain.”); supra note 78 (discussing postwar grace periods). 
 85.   Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1192–96. 
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the URAA was content-based or content-neutral, and to apply the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to the legislation.86 
On remand, the parties agreed that the URAA was a content-
neutral law, and that it should be upheld “if it advances important 
governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech 
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
further those interests.”87 The Government proffered three interests 
allegedly served by section 514. The first, compliance with Article 18 
of the Berne Convention, was conceded to be an important interest,88 
but the plaintiffs claimed that they were “reliance parties”89 and that 
Article 18(3) gave member nations the discretion to permanently 
exempt reliance parties, as several other nations had done.90 The 
district court agreed, and held that section 514 was “substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,”91 
becoming the first court ever to hold that a copyright law violated the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 
The second governmental interest offered was the protection of 
American authors abroad. The Government argued that enactment of 
section 514 would encourage other countries to reciprocate and to 
provide broad protection to American authors, despite the discretion 
afforded those countries by Article 18(3) of the Berne Convention.92 
The court, however, found that there was “no evidence showing how 
suppression of reliance parties’ First Amendment rights will lead to 
suppression of reliance parties’ rights in foreign nations, or how such 
suppression will provide a ‘direct and material’ benefit to United 
States authors.”93 Instead, the court credited testimony made before 
Congress suggesting that other nations were unlikely to follow the 
United States’ lead.94 Third, the Government argued that restoration 
of foreign authors’ copyrights was itself equitable and an important 
governmental interest. The court rejected this argument, noting that 
section 514 protects only foreign authors, and that the argument was 
 
 86.   Id. at 1196–97. 
 87.   Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009) (quoting Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (Turner II)), rev’d on other grounds, 609 F.3d 1076 
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 88.   Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 
 89.   Defined as “those persons with a vested interest in previously public-domain works.” 
Id. at 1174. 
 90.   Id. (citing Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand). 
 91.   Id. at 1175. 
 92.   Id. 
 93.   Id. at 1176. 
 94.   Id.  
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therefore inconsistent with the argument that the statute would result 
in greater copyright protection for American authors.95 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, focusing only on the 
second asserted interest.96 It held that obtaining greater copyright 
protection for American authors in other countries was an important 
government interest, and that Congress was entitled to credit 
“testimony from a number of witnesses that the United States’ 
position on the scope of copyright restoration . . . was critical to the 
United States’ ability to obtain similar protections for American 
copyright holders” in future negotiations with foreign countries.97 It 
also held that even if “the government could have complied with the 
minimal obligations of the Berne Convention and granted stronger 
protections for American reliance parties,”98 that fact was immaterial 
for two reasons: (1) Congress legitimately could have sought greater 
copyright protection for American authors abroad than the Berne 
Convention required, which could only be achieved by granting 
greater copyright protection to foreign authors here;99 and (2) 
intermediate scrutiny did not require that the Government adopt the 
least restrictive means of advancing its interest.100 It also held that in 
any event, “[t]he United Kingdom model is not substantially less 
restrictive of speech than” section 514.101 It therefore concluded that 
section 514 did not violate the First Amendment.102 
Nine months later, on March 7, 2011, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, with 
 
 95.   Id. at 1177. 
 96.   Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083–84 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. 
Ct. 1600 (2011).  
 97.   Id. at 1084–86, 1088. The court noted the existence of conflicting testimony that 
predicted other countries would not follow the United States’ example, but it held that Congress 
was entitled to weigh the conflicting evidence, and that “in areas that involve predictions of 
foreign relations and diplomacy, where empirical data will rarely be available, . . . considerable 
deference is owed to Congress and the Executive.” Id. at 1089. 
 98.   Id. at 1091. 
 99.   Id. at 1091–92. 
 100.   Id. at 1092. 
 101.   Id. at 1093. Section 514 gives U.S. reliance parties one year to sell off existing 
inventory after being placed on actual or constructive notice of restoration, and it allows reliance 
parties who created derivative works to continue to exploit those works upon payment of 
reasonable compensation to the copyright owner. Id. Under the U.K. legislation, reliance parties 
may continue using the restored work, including any derivative works, unless the copyright 
owner “buys out” the reliance party by paying compensation. Id.  
 102.   Id. at 1094. The court also rejected the Petitioner’s cross-appeal concerning the Patent 
and Copyright Clause, on the ground that the previous Tenth Circuit opinion in Golan was the 
law of the case. Id. at 1094–95. 
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Justice Kagan recusing herself because of her previous participation 
in the case.103 The questions presented to the Supreme Court are: 
(1) Does the Progress Clause [i.e., the Patent and Copyright 
Clause] of the United States Constitution prohibit Congress from 
taking works out of the public domain? 
(2) Does section 514 violate the First Amendment of the 
Constitution?104 
V.  GOLAN’S EFFECT ON AND IMPORTANCE TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
The immediate effect of Golan will be to decide whether 
thousands of foreign works whose copyrights were “restored” in 1996 
will remain under copyright, or whether they will be returned to the 
public domain. Its future implications, however, will depend on the 
decision and reasoning of the Supreme Court. 
 A. Copyright Restoration 
To understand the immediate effect of Golan, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at section 514 and how it actually operates. Section 
514 of the URAA was codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A. Effective January 
1, 1996,105 § 104A “restored” copyright protection to foreign works that 
were not in the public domain in their country of origin, but that were 
in the public domain in the United States for one of three specified 
reasons: (1) “noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by 
United States copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of 
proper notice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing 
requirements”; (2) “lack of subject matter protection in the case of 
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972”; and (3) “lack of 
national eligibility.”106 Thus, there are three categories of foreign 
works that had their copyrights restored on January 1, 1996, the first 
category of which is further divided into three subcategories. 
The first category consists of works from all eligible countries107 
that were in the public domain in the United States for lack of 
renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to meet the requirements of 
the manufacturing clause, and that were still under copyright in their 
 
 103.   Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). 
 104.   Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Golan, No. 10-545 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2010).  
 105.   17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(A) (2006). 
 106.   Id. § 104A(a)(1), (h)(6). 
 107.   Countries that are members of the Berne Convention, the World Trade Organization, 
or certain other copyright treaties. Id. § 104A(h)(3) (defining “eligible country”). 
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source countries on January 1, 1996.108 Since copyright protection is 
automatic in Berne countries, and subsists for either the life of the 
author plus seventy years (in the European Union and other 
countries)109 or the life of the author plus fifty years (in other Berne 
nations),110 the vast majority of foreign works published in 1923 or 
later were still under copyright in their source countries and were 
therefore eligible for restoration.  
The first subcategory consists of works from all eligible 
countries that were published in the United States between January 
1, 1923, and December 31, 1963, and that were not renewed. Because 
only about ten to fifteen percent of all works published during this 
period were renewed, this subcategory includes tens of thousands of 
works, including such famous works as Carl Dreyer’s The Passion of 
Joan of Arc, Fritz Lang’s Metropolis and M, Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Blackmail, The Lady Vanishes and The 39 Steps, Jean Renoir’s The 
Grand Illusion and The Rules of the Game, The Blue Angel (starring 
Marlene Dietrich), The Private Life of Don Juan (starring Douglas 
Fairbanks), The Private Life of Henry VIII (starring Charles 
Laughton), Fire Over England (starring Laurence Olivier and Vivien 
Leigh), and The Third Man (featuring Orson Welles).111 
The second subcategory consists of works from all eligible 
countries that were published in the United States without proper 
notice between January 1, 1923, and December 31, 1977,112 or 
published anywhere in the world without proper notice between 
January 1, 1978, and February 28, 1989, the day before the United 
States joined the Berne Convention.113 Works in this subcategory 
include The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings trilogy by J.R.R. 
Tolkien, writings by Joseph Conrad, George Orwell, H.G. Wells, and 
 
 108.   Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B), (h)(6)(C)(i). 
 109.   See Council Directive 2006/116 of 12 December 2006 on the Term of Protection of 
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1(1), 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 13 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:372:0012:0018:EN:PDF. 
 110.   Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(1). 
 111.   See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 82–83, 88; Copyright Restoration and Foreign 
Works: Be Careful, PUBLIC DOMAIN SHERPA, http://www.publicdomainsherpa.com/copyright-
restoration.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 112.   After initial publication with notice, the 1909 Act required notice on “each copy thereof 
published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor.” 
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 10 in 1947, 
repealed 1978). It was unclear what the effect was of publication without notice when the initial 
publication occurred in a foreign country. For a discussion of this ambiguity and its effect on 
copyright restoration, see Ochoa, supra note 21, at 295–97, 303–05, 308–10. 
 113.   Before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act, the 1976 Act 
required notice be placed “[w]henever a work . . . is published in the United States or elsewhere.” 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 401(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2576. 
Ochoa__Page.doc (Do Not Delete) 10/3/11 2:39 PM 
140 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC  [Vol. 64:123 
Virginia Woolf, paintings by Pablo Picasso (including Guernica), 
drawings of M.C. Escher, and innumerable photographs.114 
The third subcategory consists of nondramatic literary works in 
the English language published between January 1, 1923, and July 1, 
1986, that were not manufactured in the United States.115 Since most 
major publishers complied with the manufacturing clause when it was 
operative, this subcategory includes far fewer works than the other 
two. Moreover, foreign publishers of English-language works could 
deposit a foreign edition for ad interim protection and then register 
the American edition when it was published.116 However, if the ad 
interim copyright expired before an American edition was published, 
the work entered the public domain and was eligible for copyright 
restoration.117 
The second category consists of sound recordings from all 
eligible countries that were fixed before February 15, 1972 (the date 
sound recordings became eligible for federal copyright protection),118 
and that were not in the public domain in their source countries on 
 
 114.   See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 82–83, 88; PUBLIC DOMAIN SHERPA, supra note 
111. 
 115.   The 1909 Act required that all English-language books and periodicals be printed and 
bound within the United States, from type set within the United States, or by engraving or 
lithography done within the United States, with certain exceptions. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 
320, § 15, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078–79 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 16 in 1947, repealed 1978). 
The 1976 Act required that copies of nondramatic literary works in English be manufactured in 
either the United States or Canada, with certain exceptions, with a sunset date of July 1, 1982. 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 601, 90 Stat. 2541, 2588. The sunset date was extended to July 1, 1986, by 
Pub. L. No. 97-215, 96 Stat. 178 (1982). The expired provision was finally repealed in 2010. 
Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-295, § 4(a), 124 
Stat. 3180, 3180. 
 116.   Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 21–22, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 22–23 in 1947, repealed 1978). As originally enacted, the foreign edition had to be 
deposited within thirty days of publication in the foreign country, and the ad interim copyright 
lasted only thirty days, which did not provide enough time to get a new edition published in the 
United States. Id. § 21. In 1919, Congress amended the statute to provide that the foreign 
edition could be deposited within sixty days of the foreign publication, and the ad interim 
copyright would last for four months. Pub. L. No. 66-102, 41 Stat. 368, 369. In 1949, Congress 
again amended the statute to provide that the foreign edition could be deposited within six 
months of the foreign publication, and the ad interim copyright would last for five years. Pub. L. 
No. 81-84, §2, 63 Stat. 153, 154 (codified at former 17 U.S.C. § 22, repealed 1978). In the 1976 
Act, Congress eliminated ad interim protection and instead gave an alleged infringer a defense if 
foreign-made copies were imported or distributed by the copyright owner in violation of the 
manufacturing clause and the infringing copies were manufactured in the United States or 
Canada. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 601(d), 90 Stat 2541, 2589 (repealed 2010). 
 117.   According to one scholar, the combination of the ad interim provisions and copyright 
“has made it almost impossible to determine with certainty whether a book published in the 
United States after 1922 and before 1964 is in the public domain.” Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright 
Renewal, Copyright Restoration, and the Difficulty of Determining Copyright Status, D-LIB MAG., 
(July/Aug. 2008), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/july08/hirtle/07hirtle.html. 
 118.   See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2006). 
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January 1, 1996.119 In most countries, sound recordings are not 
protected by “copyright,” or author’s rights, but are instead accorded 
protection under so-called “neighboring rights.”120 Indeed, sound 
recordings are not protected under the Berne Convention, but are 
instead the subject of a separate treaty, the Rome Convention, to 
which the United States is not a party.121 The United States, however, 
is a party to the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms,122 as well as the TRIPS Agreement and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”).123 Under the Rome Convention and the 
Geneva Convention, sound recordings are protected for a minimum of 
only twenty years from the date of fixation (for Rome) or the date of 
first publication (for Geneva).124 However, under the TRIPS 
Agreement, sound recordings are protected for at least fifty years from 
the date of fixation;125 and under the WPPT, sound recordings are 
protected for at least fifty years from the date of first publication, if 
they are published within fifty years of fixation.126 Thus, sound 
recordings from most foreign countries are eligible if they were fixed 
(or published) between January 1, 1946, and February 14, 1972.127 
 
 119.   Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B), (h)(6)(C)(ii). 
 120.   See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 13, § 2.2.2, at 22; 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE 
C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION 
AND BEYOND §§ 19.01–19.04, at 1205–10 (2d ed. 2006) (introducing the background and 
development of the “neighbouring right” concept). 
 121.   See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html [hereinafter Rome Convention]; 
Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=17 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (listing contracting parties 
to the Rome Convention). 
 122.   See Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 888 U.N.T.S. 67, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/phonograms/trtdocs_wo023.html [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention]; Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=18 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (listing 
contracting parties to the Geneva Convention). 
 123.   See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html [hereinafter 
WPPT]; Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=20 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (listing contracting 
parties to the WPPT). 
 124.   Rome Convention, supra note 121, art. 14; Geneva Convention, supra note 122, art. 4. 
 125.   TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, art. 14(5). 
 126.   WPPT, supra note 123, art. 17(2). 
 127.   If the source country protects sound recordings for fifty years rather than twenty years, 
then a sound recording fixed or published in its source country in 1946 or later would not be in 
the public domain in its source country on January 1, 1996, the date of restoration. 
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This category includes such important sound recordings as all of the 
recordings of the Beatles, Tommy by The Who, early recordings by Led 
Zeppelin (“Stairway to Heaven”), the Rolling Stones, and Pink Floyd, 
and the best-selling classical album of all time, a complete recording of 
Wagner’s four-opera Ring of the Nibelungen cycle, conducted by Georg 
Solti.128 As of January 1, 1996, these foreign sound recordings received 
federal copyright protection in the United States for the first time.129 
However, this category of works cannot truly be said to have been 
“removed” from the public domain. This is because federal copyright 
law does not (and will not) preempt state-law protection for sound 
recordings until February 15, 2067,130 and most states likely will 
protect foreign as well as domestic sound recordings under their 
common law.131 Thus, intentionally or not, section 514 arguably 
resulted in these foreign sound recordings having both state and 
federal protection. If the Supreme Court holds that section 514 is 
unconstitutional, these sound recordings will remain protected (and 
therefore out of the public domain) as a matter of state law. In other 
words, for this category, the decision in Golan will have no practical 
effect. 
The third category consists of works from those eligible 
countries with whom the United States did not have any copyright 
relations until sometime after January 1, 1923, and that were not in 
the public domain in their source countries on January 1, 1996.132 
While the United States has long had copyright treaty relations with 
its major trading partners in Western Europe and Latin America,133 
this category includes all works published (after 1922) in Russia and 
 
 128.   See NORMAN LEBRECHT, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF CLASSICAL MUSIC: FEATURING THE 
100 BEST AND 20 WORST RECORDINGS EVER MADE 136, 209–11 (2007) (describing Solti’s 
eighteen-million-selling recording).  
 129.   17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 130.   Id. § 301(c). 
 131.   See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 265 (N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that all sound recordings are entitled to perpetual protection under New York common 
law until federal preemption occurs, even if they are in the public domain in their country of 
origin). 
 132.   17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B), (h)(6)(C)(iii) (2006). 
 133.   The United States established bilateral copyright relations with Belgium, France, the 
United Kingdom, and Switzerland on July 1, 1891, with Germany on April 15, 1892, with Italy 
on October 31, 1892, with Spain on July 10, 1895, with Mexico on February 27, 1896, with Chile 
on May 25, 1896, with Costa Rica on October 18, 1899, with Japan on May 10, 1906, with 
Canada on January 1, 1924, and with Argentina on August 23, 1934. The United States joined 
the Buenos Aires Convention effective July 13, 1914, through which copyright relations were 
established with Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay before 1923, 
and with Colombia on December 23, 1936. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 38A: 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 2–10 (2010). 
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the countries of the former Soviet Union before May 27, 1973;134 in the 
People’s Republic of China before March 17, 1992;135 in Hong Kong 
before August 1, 1973;136 in Singapore before May 18, 1987;137 in South 
Korea before October 1, 1987;138 in North Korea before April 28, 
2003;139 and in Turkey and the former Yugoslavian states before 
March 1, 1989,140 among other countries. Important works in this 
category include most of the works of twentieth century Russian 
composers Sergei Prokofiev, Dmitri Shostakovich, and Igor 
Stravinsky,141 and Russian films such as Sergei Eisenstein’s The 
Battleship Potemkin and Alexander Nevsky.142 
The immediate effect of Golan will be to determine whether all 
of these works (and thousands of others) validly had their copyrights 
restored in 1996, or whether they are all (once again) in the public 
domain in the United States. The long-term impact of the opinion, 
however, may be even greater. 
 
 134.   Id. at 9, 11 n.2. 
 135.   Id. at 3, 11 nn.5–6. 
 136.   Id. at 4, 11 n.13. 
 137.   Id. at 9. 
 138.   Id. at 5. 
 139.   Id. Because North Korea joined the Berne Convention after 1996, the effective date of 
copyright protection for preexisting works would be the date of its accession (Apr. 28, 2003). 17 
U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(B) (2006). 
 140.   The former Yugoslavian states are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 133, at 3, 5, 8–9. Both 
Turkey and Yugoslavia were members of the Berne Convention before the United States joined. 
See id. at 9 (Turkey); World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Notification No. 75, 
Ratification by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Paris Act (1971), June 2, 1975, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_75.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011). Hence, works published in these countries after the United States joined 
the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989, are not in the public domain and did not need to be 
restored. 
 141.   See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 56, 66, 69–71, 76. 
 142.   These films were first published in 1925 and 1938, respectively. See www.imdb.com/ 
title/tt0015648 and www.imdb.com/title/tt0029850. In 1925, the former Soviet Union had a 
copyright term of twenty-five years from first publication, which was increased to life of the 
author plus fifteen years in 1928, and to life of the author plus twenty-five years in 1973. See 
MICHIEL ELST, COPYRIGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND CULTURAL POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 74–76, 81–83 (2005). Eisenstein died in 1948, and because the 1973 law was not 
retroactive, id. at 527, these films were in the public domain in the Soviet Union from 1964 
onward. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the Russian Federation enacted a new 
copyright law in 1993 that has a duration of life of the author plus fifty years. Id. at 393, 436. 
Because the 1993 law was retroactive, id. at 525–35 (analyzing the problem and concluding that 
retroactive application was intended), the films were no longer in the public domain in Russia on 
January 1, 1996, the date of restoration. 
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B. Future Implications 
Ultimately, what is at stake in Golan is nothing less than the 
entire corpus of works in the public domain, and even the entire 
concept of a public domain. If the Court holds that the Patent and 
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment prohibits removal of 
material from the public domain, then the public domain will indeed 
be irrevocable, and the public will have a bright-line constitutional 
safeguard against future incursions by Congress.143 If the Court holds 
that material may be removed from the public domain, but only for 
specified reasons or only within certain limits, then any future 
congressional action regarding the public domain will at least be 
subject to constitutional challenge. But if the Court holds that 
Congress has the discretion to remove material from the public 
domain whenever it chooses, the potential future consequences will be 
staggering. 
If Congress can validly take any work out of the public domain 
and put it back under copyright protection, then there is nothing to 
keep Congress from taking all works out of the public domain and 
putting them back under copyright protection. The works of 
Shakespeare, Beethoven, Jane Austen, Mark Twain, and millions of 
other long-deceased authors could be privatized and become the 
private property of a particular publisher,144 just as they were before 
the House of Lords’ landmark decision in Donaldson v. Becket,145 
which recognized the public domain for the first time in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.146 Moreover, the “limited Times” restriction 
in the Patent and Copyright Clause will be rendered a dead letter. In 
 
 143.   See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01-
618.pdf (“Question [Justice Souter]: If the equity argument under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause justifies extension of the copyright for those whose copyright will expire tomorrow if it's 
not extended, in order to put them on parity with those getting copyrights for new works, why 
doesn't it apply to the copyright, the holder of the copyright that expired yesterday? General 
Olson [for the Government]: You could arguably—you could conceivably make that argument, 
Justice Souter, but there is a bright line there. Something that has already gone into the public 
domain, which other individuals or companies or entities may then have acquired an interest in, 
or rights to, or be involved in disseminating . . . .”). 
 144.   See id. at 29–30 (“Question [Justice Breyer]: [I]f Congress tomorrow wants to give a 
copyright to a publisher solely for the purpose of reproducing and disseminating Ben Jonson, 
Shakespeare, it can do it? General Olson [for the Government]: It may . . . . I don't think there is 
a per se rule that should apply here because this is a grant of Congress, to Congress to exercise 
its judgment as to what may be beneficial.”). 
 145.   [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 146.   See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 223–24; Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly 
Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675, 682–84 (2002). 
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Eldred, the majority responded to the argument that copyright term 
extension would effectively allow “perpetual copyright on the 
installment plan”147 by stating that there was no evidence that 
Congress was attempting to protect copyrights in perpetuity.148 But if 
Congress can restore copyrights, there is no need for copyright term 
extension: Congress can simply allow the “limited Times” to expire 
and then restore the copyrights in the works for another “limited 
Time” the following day. 
Perhaps these scenarios seem far-fetched—although in a 
political system that relies on checks and balances, we should be loath 
to accept that nothing more than congressional forbearance and good 
sense will protect the public domain from significant depletion. But 
there is one scenario that is anything but far-fetched: if the Court 
upholds copyright restoration for foreign works, and the opinion in 
any way states or implies that failure to comply with the “formalities” 
formerly imposed under U.S. law does not irrevocably place works into 
the public domain in a way that implicates the Constitution, then 
Congress will come under tremendous pressure from domestic 
copyright owners to give them the benefit of the same bargain that 
was given to foreign copyright owners in 1996. Domestic copyright 
owners will cry that it is “unfair” to give significant benefits of 
copyright restoration to foreign copyright owners without affording 
the same benefit to U.S. copyright owners, and domestic reliance 
parties will be hard-pressed to explain why the line should be drawn 
here. The result will very likely be that the eighty-five to ninety 
percent of all works that were not renewed between 1923 and 1963, 
and the tens of thousands of works that were published without 
proper copyright notice, will once again be placed under copyright 
protection. The temptations for putative copyright owners to earn 
monopoly profits are simply too great. Public choice theory suggests 
that a small minority with a lot of money to gain will consistently be 
more successful in lobbying Congress than a diffuse majority that will 
 
 147.   Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 303 (1996). The phrase 
originated in Jaszi’s testimony to Congress in 1995. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 73 (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi, 
Professor, American University Washington College of Law). 
 148.   Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208–10 (2003). But see id. at 242 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] categorical rule prohibiting retroactive extensions would effectively preclude 
perpetual copyrights. More importantly, . . . unless the Clause is construed to embody such a 
categorical rule, Congress may extend existing monopoly privileges ad infinitum under the 
majority's analysis.”); Ochoa, supra note 40, at 45 & n.150 (quoting Rep. Mary Bono, who 
expressly sought a copyright term of “forever less one day”). 
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each lose only a small amount of money with each transaction,149 even 
though the net result will be a congressional giveaway of billions of 
dollars of public property to private ownership. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the first two hundred years of our history, copyright was a 
relatively short-term proposition: some works entered the public 
domain immediately upon publication, if the author or publisher failed 
to comply with the prescribed statutory formalities; the vast majority 
of works entered the public domain after only fourteen or twenty-eight 
years; and a small percentage of financially lucrative works were 
renewed and received a total of twenty-eight, forty-two, or fifty-six 
years of copyright protection before entering the public domain.150 
Each year, the public received the benefit of new works entering the 
public domain, where they would remain irrevocably.151 Today, 
copyright lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years—likely 
three or four generations for most works.152 Virtually no one will live 
to see the favorite works of their childhood enter the public domain, 
and no published works will enter the public domain again until 
2019.153 Indeed, the very notion of the public domain as a repository of 
works existing for the benefit of the public is under attack. 
In Golan v. Holder, the plaintiffs are challenging only one piece 
of Congress’s assault on the public domain: the grant or restoration of 
copyright protection to foreign works that were previously in the 
public domain. The Supreme Court will decide whether the public 
domain will remain irrevocable and inviolate, or whether it exists only 
at the whim and forbearance of Congress and can be taken away from 
the public and privatized at any time. 
 
 
 149.   On public choice theory as applied to copyright, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright 
Duration: Theories and Practice, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 133, 
138 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
 150.   The 1790 Act had a fourteen-year term, renewable once; the 1831 Act had a twenty-
eight-year initial term, with a fourteen-year renewal term; and the 1909 Act had a twenty-eight-
year term, renewable once. Ochoa, supra note 40, at 29–32, 38–39. See also supra notes 17–22, 
40–41 and accompanying text.  
 151.   See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 152.   17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 153.   See supra note 58. 
